From the 1974-75 Recession to the ‘Volcker Shock’

As I explained last week, the devaluation of the U.S. dollar in terms of gold had temporarily halted by the end of 1974. After peaking at $195.25 an ounce on December 30, 1974, the dollar price of gold had fallen to $104.00 on August 31, 1976.

As a result, during 1975 the rate of U.S. inflation as measured by the government producer price index was “only” about 4.4 percent. Still, the official producer price index rose more in the recession-depression year of 1975 than it had in the inflationary boom year of 1965. This despite a slump that was considerably worse than that of 1957-58.

The U.S. workers—and workers in other capitalist countries—were hit in two ways. One, workers’ living standards were lowered by the rising cost of living in terms of the devalued currency their wages were paid in. In a more traditional type recession-depression, the cost of living would have been expected to fall.

Second, just like was the case in a traditional crisis-depression, wages were under downward pressure from the high rate of unemployment. In the case of U.S. workers, this was on top of the disastrous—for U.S. workers—wage and price controls that had been imposed by the Nixon administration.

The Industrial Cycle and the Collapse of the Gold Pool in March 1968

Industrial cycles normally last about 10 years—give or take a year or two. The second industrial cycle after World War II began with the 1957-58 global recession. Given the fact that the industrial cycle lasts about 10 years, we would normally expect the next global downturn to occur around 1967. And indeed 1966-67 saw not only the “mini-recession” in the United States but the recession of 1966-67 in West Germany.

However, in 1967 the U.S. government and the Federal Reserve System were determined to avoid a recession on anything like the scale of the recession a decade earlier. As I explained in last week’s post, the bourgeois Keynesian economists believed that they understood the workings of the capitalist economy well enough to develop the “tools” that would allow the capitalists governments and central banks to avoid full-scale recessions in the future. Indeed in 1967, the U.S. economy escaped with only a “mini-recession.”

But just as the Keynesians were celebrating their final victory over the industrial cycle and its crises, there came the March 1968 run on gold, which led to the collapse of the London Gold Pool. The U.S. government and Federal Reserve System, seeking to stave off the complete collapse of the dollar-gold exchange standard, felt obliged to take deflationary measures. The fed funds rate, which on October 25, 1967, had fallen to as low as 2.00 percent, rose to 5.13 percent on March 15, 1968, the day the gold pool collapsed.

The U.S. Economy in the Wake of the Economic Crisis of 1957-61

Thanks to the economic crisis of 1957-61, the U.S. economy entered the decade of the 1960s with high levels of unemployment and excess capacity. The millions of unemployed workers and idle plants and machines meant that industrial production could increase rapidly in response to rising demand.

Since supply was increasing almost as fast as demand, prices rose very slowly. At least according to the official U.S. producer price index, prices hardly changed between 1960 and 1964.

As is typical of the phase of average prosperity of the industrial cycle, long-term interest rates rose very slowly. Still, at around 4 percent or slightly higher they had risen significantly since the Korean War days. Back then, the Truman administration still expected to borrow money long term at less than 2.5 percent. Slowly but surely long-term interest rates were eating into the profit of enterprise.

The 1960s economic boom begins

During most of the early 1960s, the U.S. economy was passing through the phase of average prosperity that precedes the boom. But starting in 1965, the industrial cycle entered the boom phase proper.

The transition from average prosperity to boom is part of the industrial cycle. However, in the mid-1960s this transition was helped along by government economic policies. These were, first, the Kennedy-Johnson tax cut of 1964 combined with the rapid escalation the war against Vietnam. After remaining virtually unchanged through 1964, the official U.S. producer price index suddenly surged 3.5 percent in 1965. That was the year the escalation of the Vietnam War began in earnest.

Does Capitalist Production Have a Long Cycle? (pt 7)

Eightieth anniversary of start of super-crisis

To understand the policies that are being followed by the governments and central banks today as they combat the aftermath of the panic of last fall and winter, you need to understand the events of 80 years ago. The current governments and central bankers are very much haunted by the ghost of the Depression.

Several weeks ago, I explained how World I and its war economy had led to a huge divergence between prices and values. This contradiction reached it peak in the spring of 1920 and was partially resolved by the deflationary recession of 1920-21. Why then didn’t the Great Depression begin with the deflation of 1920 rather than in 1929?

Does Capitalist Production Have a Long Cycle? (pt 3)

The mid-Victorian boom

The period from 1848 to 1873 is sometimes called by economic historians the mid-Victorian boom. It saw a huge expansion of industry, world trade and a generally rising price trend. The mid-Victorian boom was not crisis-free, however. A sharp if brief crisis erupted in 1857, and another occurred in 1866.

The economic crash that hit Austria and Germany hard in the spring of 1873 and spread to Wall Street that fall is generally considered to mark the end of the mid-Victorian boom and the beginning of the “Great Depression” of the 19th century. Thereafter, prices trended downwards until bottoming out in 1896.

For supporters of the long-cycle theory, the mid-Victorian boom represented an upswing in the long cycle, or for supporters of Mandel-type long waves, an expansionary long wave. Students of this episode in economic history have the advantage of being able to study the economic commentaries of Marx and Engels themselves, both in published works and private letters.

The Ideas of John Maynard Keynes (pt 5)

Keynes on the ‘trade cycle’

Keynes throughout the “General Theory” was concerned with explaining how his marginalist concept of “equilibrium”—marginal efficiency of capital = rate of interest—could correspond to mass unemployment. The industrial cycle itself was of secondary concern for Keynes. But in chapter 22, entitled “Notes on the Trade Cycle,” he does deal with the industrial cycle, or as he called it in the English manner, the “trade cycle” or “industrial trade cycle.”

When he did deal with the industrial cycle, marginalism hindered Keynes at every step. Unlike the classical economists and Marx, the marginalists do not distinguish between use value and exchange value. As a marginalist, even if an unorthodox one, Keynes therefore had problems in explaining how commodities could be overproduced yet be “scarce” at the same time.

The Ideas of John Maynard Keynes (pt 3)

Ricardo and Marx versus Keynes

Ricardo, unlike Adam Smith, attempted to use the law of labor value consistently. He sensed that the law of labor value applied not only to simple commodity production but also to capitalism proper. Ricardo was not completely successful in this, but he was certainly on the right track. He realized that price is a relationship between two commodities, the commodities whose price is being measured and the money commodity—gold—in which the price of the commodity is reckoned.

According to the Ricardian law of labor value, market prices tend to fluctuate around an axis determined by the relative values of gold and the commodity whose value gold is measuring. Ricardo realized that a rise or fall in wages would affect the rate of profit but not the overall prices of commodities.

Marx developed Ricardo’s law of labor value further, resolving the contradictions that Ricardo himself was unable to overcome. However, even the Ricardian version of the law of labor value is quite sufficient to refute the claim of Keynes that wages determine prices.

As for Marx, he demonstrated in the first three chapters of volume I of “Capital” that price must always be measured in terms of the use value of the commodity that serves as the universal equivalent. Assuming gold is the money commodity, exchange value, or what comes to exactly the same thing, price, is always a certain quantity gold measured in terms of weight.

Ricardo’s Theories Challenged by the Crises of 1825 and 1837

Shortly after Ricardo’s death, the crisis of 1825, the first global crisis of overproduction, swept over Britain. In 1837, a second global crisis erupted with far more devastating results. It was followed by years of industrial depression and mass unemployment. Stormy class struggles broke out, and in Britain out of this came the Chartist Movement, the first mass working-class political party. It was during the depression that followed the crisis of 1837 that Marx and Engels were themselves radicalized.

The Phases of the Industrial Cycle (pt.4)

From boom to crisis

Marx sometimes called the stage of the industrial cycle just before the outbreak of the crisis the phase of fictitious prosperity. The economy is going gang-busters, the rate of profit appears to be high, and the mass of profit keeps growing. Unemployment compared to all other phases of the industrial cycle is very low and still falling. At long last, the balance of forces on the labor market are beginning to tilt in favor the working class.

But the continuation of the boom now depends on the increasingly unsustainable inflation of credit. As long as debts can be “rolled over” rather than paid, and terms of payment can be further extended, the boom can go on.

Later, after the boom’s inevitable collapse, the recriminations fly. Why was “regulation” so lax? Why were so many derivatives and exotic credit instruments created? How could so many loans have been extended to people who couldn’t possibly repay them?

But those questions will be asked later. While the phase of fictitious prosperity lasts, it can only be maintained by progressively eliminating regulations designed to prevent the reckless extension of credit and instead encouraging “financial innovation” to unfold without hindrance.

The Phases of the Industrial Cycle (pt. 3)

The real industrial boom begins

The boom phase of the industrial cycle is of particular interest for crisis theory. It is only during the boom that capitalist expanded reproduction develops with full vigor. Therefore, it is the boom that develops the contradictions inherent in capitalist production to the point where they can only be resolved—only temporarily as long as capitalist production is retained—by a crisis.

I explained in the last post that during the phase of average prosperity, excess capacity is whittled away at both ends, so to speak, by the closing down of factories that will never again be profitable, and the reopening of factories and machinery that after write-downs can once again yield to the industrial capitalists the average rate of profit.

As the margin of excess capacity shrinks, the percentage of industry that is lying idle is reduced to such an extent that the industrial capitalists are forced to undertake massive investments in new factories packed with state-of-the-art machinery. The industrial capitalists do not want to see their margin of excess capacity shrink to zero. They want to maintain a certain margin of excess capacity so production can be quickly increased to meet any sudden rise in demand.